Elkus v. Elkus: A Step in the Wrong Direction by Menhennet, Janine R.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-1992
Elkus v. Elkus: A Step in the Wrong Direction
Janine R. Menhennet
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Janine R. Menhennet, Elkus v. Elkus: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 12 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 561 (1992).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol12/iss2/11
ELKUS V. ELKUS: A STEP IN THE WRONG DIRECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the womens' movement began about three decades ago, the
law has struggled to keep pace with the continually evolving status of
women in society. This is particularly evident in the family law context,'
most notably in marital dissolution. Although the various states deal
individually with community property or common law property sys-
tems,' courts have uniformly endeavored to recognize each spouse's con-
tribution to the marriage, monetary or otherwise. This progression was
necessary, in light of the increase in the divorce rate and displacement of
wives who had previously stayed home and come away with nothing but
alimony after years of devotion.3
Examples of the law's effort to grant women equal status in mar-
riage are California's community property laws and New York's equita-
ble distribution statutes. As of 1975, California allowed spouses co-equal
management and control over community assets,4 with certain restric-
tions for real property transactions.5 Prior to this enactment, the hus-
1. Mary Ann Glendon, Family Reform in the 1980'4. 44 LA. L. REv. 1553 (1984). The
author states that "there was more activity in American family law in that twenty-year [1960-
1979] period than there had been in the preceding hundred years." IM. at 1553.
2. Community property is defined as
[p]roperty owned in common by husband and wife each having an undivided one-
half interest by reason of their marital status. [Nine states have community property
systems.] The rest of the states are classified as common law jurisdictions.... In a
common law system, each spouse owns whatever he or she earns. Under a commu-
nity property system, one-half of the earnings of each spouse is considered owned by
the other spouse.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 280 (6th ed. 1990).
3. Glendon, supra note 1, at 1553. "The 1960's and 1970's-were times] when divorce
rates and women's and mothers' labor force participation rates were increasing at unprece-
dented speed .... Id
4. California Civil Code section 5125(a) provides in relevant part: "[E]ither spouse has
the management and control of the community personal property, whether acquired prior to
or on or after January 1, 1975, with like absolute power of disposition, other than testamen-
tary, as the spouse has of the separate estate of the spouse." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(a) (West
1991).
5. California Civil Code section 5127 provides in relevant part:
[Elither spouse has the management and control of the community real property,
whether acquired prior to or on or after January 1, 1975, but both spouses either
personally or by duly authorized agent, must join in executing any instrument by
which such community real property or any interest therein is leased for a longer
period than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or encumbered....
CAL. CVIL CODE § 5127 (West 1987).
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band had complete dominion over the community property.6 New York,
a common law state, uses equitable distribution to divide the marital es-
tate. Upon dissolution, the court is directed to consider tangible, as well
as intangible, contributions to the marriage,7 in order to compensate a
spouse who chose to stay home and take care of the family instead of
being a wage earner."
The goals of New York's equitable distribution statutes are laudable.
Recently, however, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
has distorted them in an overreaching interpretation in the decision of
Elkus v. Elkus ("Elkus').9 This note discusses the Elkus court's pur-
ported division of an opera singer's voice, or talent, by categorizing it as a
marital asset. Further, it criticizes the court's supposition that one's
voice is subject to "distribution" upon divorce. This note concludes that
the Elkus court unnecessarily went beyond the purposes behind equitable
distribution and marital property in general, in an attempt to divide as-
sets upon divorce which did not really exist.
II. BACKGROUND: THE FACTS AND HOLDING OF ELKUS
Frederica von Stade was a minor player with New York's Metropol-
itan Opera Company (the "Met") in 1973, when she married Peter
6. California Civil Code section 172 gave to the husband "the management and control of
the community personal property, with like absolute power of disposition, other than testa-
mentary, as he has of his separate estate." CAL. CIV. CODE § 172 (repealed 1969). As stated in
Grolemund v. Cafferata, 111 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1941), the effect of this statute is that it "subjects
the entire community personalty ... to any and all contracts of the husband as well as to
judgments arising out of his tort." I I I P.2d at 643.
7. Domestic Relations Law (DRL) section 236(B)(5)(d), the statute relevant to this note,
directs the court to consider:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the
time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to
the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint
efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage
earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party;
(7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any in-
terest in a business, corporation or profession;
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d) (McKinney 1990).
8. 'The purpose behind the enactment of the legislation was to prevent inequities which
previously occurred upon the dissolution of a marriage." Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901,
903 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
9. Id at 901.
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Elkus, a singer and teacher."° When they met, she was earning $2,250
per year with the Met." At dissolution, she was earning $621,878 per
year. 12 Mr. Elkus gave up his own singing career during the marriage, to
coach his wife and nurture her career, which took off. He also looked
after their two children. 3 Elkus claimed that because his efforts had
contributed to his wife's rise to fame, her fame should be classified as a
marital asset, subject to distribution upon divorce. 4 The Supreme Court
of New York County held that celebrity status was not a marital asset. 5
Mr. Elkus had already reaped the financial benefits of their joint effort,
and substantial tangible marital property existed to amply compensate
any equitable claim he had. 6
On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed on the
basis of section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law ("DRL"), which au-
thorizes a court to consider all tangible and intangible contributions by
each spouse to the marital partnership. 7 Additionally, DRL section 236
broadly defines marital property as property acquired during the mar-
riage "regardless of the form in which title is held."'" The court inter-
preted this section to encompass items "outside the scope of traditional
property concepts,"' 9 including assets that cannot be transferred or ex-
changed. To buttress its position, the court referred to other decisions
holding that various licenses, degrees, and other practices were subject to
distribution as marital property.2' The court primarily relied on the
decision in O'Brien v. O'Brien ("O'Brien"),2' in which Mrs. O'Brien was
awarded a share in her husband's medical license because they had no
other assets to divide.2 2 To avoid the inequity that would befall Mrs.
O'Brien if the court relied on traditional divorce remedies, the court pio-
neered an expansive reading of DRL section 236 and declared Mr.
O'Brien's medical degree and license to be marital property.
10. Id at 901-02.
11. Id at 902.
12. Id
13. Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (1991).
14. Id
15. Id at 901.
16. Id at 902.
17. See supra note 7 for provisions of statute.
18. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986).
19. Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (1991).
20. Savasta v. Savasta, 549 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1989) (medical board certification); Cronin v.
Cronin, 502 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1986) (a law degree); Vanasco v. Vanasco, 503 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1986)
(an accounting degree); Morton v. Morton, 515 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1987) (a podiatry practice). See
Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 902-03.
21. 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).
22. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 713.
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The Elkus court characterized Mrs. Elkus' career as marital prop-
erty in an attempt to fulfill the legislative intent behind DRL section 236:
The purpose behind the enactment of the legislation was to pre-
vent inequities which previously occurred upon the dissolution
of a marriage. Any attempt to limit marital property to profes-
sions which are licensed would only serve to discriminate
against the spouses of those engaged in other areas of employ-
ment. Such a distinction would fail to carry out the premise
upon which equitable distribution is based, i.e., that a marriage
is an economic partnership to which both parties
contribute.... 23
The crux of the court's reasoning was that the contribution of the non-
earning spouse, rather than the nature of the earning spouse's career,
should be the determinative factor in characterizing an asset as marital
property for distribution purposes.24 Accordingly, because Mr. Elkus
had been voice coach and primary babysitter, his wife's celebrity status
was subject to valuation and distribution upon divorce.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Flaws in the Elkus Court's Reasoning
1. The Court's Interpretation of Property Under DRL § 236
There is no dispute that the definition of marital property under
DRL section 236 is expansive: "all property acquired .. .during the
marriage... regardless of the form in which title is held."25 However,
nothing in the statute creates the impression that the courts have free
license to devise new forms of property. The courts merely have greater
discretion to distribute the existing property. One commentator aptly
noted this distinction, stating that:
[T]he O'Brien court intermingled the process of classifying mar-
ital property with that of distributing it.... An examination of
the language of the nine distribution factors as a whole reveals
that they are not definitional, but instead act as weights upon a
balance, thereby tipping the property distribution decision to-
ward one party or the other. These factors indicate a legislative
intent to reward certain spousal contributions to the marital
partnership with a favorable distribution of marital property,
23. Elku, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
24. Id. at 904-05.
25. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986).
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not a favorable classification of it.26
Proper interpretation of the statute, without more, leads to a liberal
award of property to the contributing spouse if his or her investment in
the enhanced spouse has not been returned.
The court in O'Brien, however, indulged in an unnecessary, liberal
interpretation of property to benefit the contributing spouse: it inter-
preted as property the enhanced earning capacity of Mr. O'Brien's de-
gree. It reasoned that this was the only way to do justice to Mrs. O'Brien
in light of the sparse marital assets acquired: Mr. O'Brien asked for a
divorce just two months after graduation, after Mrs. O'Brien had sup-
ported his schooling for nine years.27 A problem with this liberal award
is the permanent effect it has on the enhanced spouse. As one court
noted,
[Whether a court awarded a lump sum or periodic payments
[as in O'Brien], the receiving spouse would be given what is
tantamount to a lifetime estate in the paying spouse's earnings
that have no necessary relationship to the receiving spouse's ac-
tual contribution to the enhanced earning power or to that
spouse's need, however broadly defined.2"
A life estate in an ex-spouse's future earnings seems a Draconian penalty
for getting a divorce, no matter how closely it follows upon graduation,
when a liberal support award will usually compensate the non-enhanced
spouse. Such a broad interpretation of a vague statute is unwarranted.
Alternatively, in Lesman v. Lesman,29 where the wife raised chil-
dren while the husband put himself through school,30 the court rejected
on policy grounds the proposition that the enhanced earning capacity of
a license holder could ever be marital property: "IT]he concept of prop-
erty cannot, as a matter of rationality or common sense, be defined by a
purely circumstantial criterion. If a license or degree or its enhanced
earning potential is not property five or ten or twenty years after gradua-
tion, it cannot be property on graduation day either."3 It seems con-
trived to allow the definition of an asset to depend on the peculiarities of
each case.
In analyzing the flaws of equitable distribution, one scholar noted
26. Michael R. Herman, Comment, Not What the Doctor Ordered-Medical License De-
clared Marital Property: O'Brien v. O'Brien. 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 539, 545-46 (1986).
27. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713-14 (1985).
28. Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1991).
29. 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
30. Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 936-37.
31. Ia at 939 (quoting Mahoney v. Mahoney, 442 A.2d 1062, 1068 (N.J. Super. 1982)).
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that such a statutory scheme is "more properly called discretionary dis-
tribution, since what consistently distinguishes them from their predeces-
sors, is not that they are more equitable, but that they are more
unpredictable."32 In O'Brien, the court declared the license marital
property to protect the sacrifices Mrs. O'Brien had made, and the result
may seem justified. The Elkus court, however, took a giant leap when it
assumed that an opera singer's voice, the essence of her career, may also
be characterized as marital property.
2. Talent Is a Personal, Inseparable Asset
A voice is an innate personal attribute, incapable of being divested
from its owner. Additionally, the domestic relations statute's definition
of marital property presupposes an asset with a title.3 One's voice is
incapable of being "titled"; it cannot be looked up in the county re-
corder's office, put on a sheepskin, or listed on a stock certificate. One
cannot pay taxes on a voice. A bodily, personal attribute should not be
dehumanized by suggesting that it can be divided upon divorce. It was
never the spouse's attribute to acquire.
Marital property is defined by section 236 as "all property acquired
during the marriage by either or both spouses."34 It is difficult to assert
that someone acquires her voice during marriage. One is born with a
voice, assuming no unfortunate defects. In Elkus, it was established that
Mrs. Elkus was already singing with the Met when she married Mr.
Elkus;" therefore, she had her voice before their marriage. It is not dis-
puted that her voice improved during marriage, and this fact forms the
basis for Mr. Elkus' claim. Being an innate attribute, however, a voice
should not be susceptible to a claim of division upon dissolution. It is
analogous to a claim by Tom Hayden that Jane Fonda's body is a marital
asset because it improved and made money during the marriage. Such a
position is simply untenable.
Additionally, a possible Thirteenth Amendment problem exists in
the Elkus court's decision to award Mr. Elkus a property interest in his
wife's voice. This Amendment abolished slavery, or involuntary servi-
tude.36 To award a property right in the future labor of another, as with
32. Glendon, supra note 1, at 1556.
33. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986) ("'[Marital property' shall
mean all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage ... regardless of the
form in which title is held .. ") (emphasis added).
34. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986).
35. Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 901-02 (1991).
36. The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "[n]either slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
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the O'Briens, or in one's personalty, as with a voice, is a form of involun-
tary servitude, by judicially ordering one to work or sing for another. As
one scholar has noted:
Our law rejected the notion that one person can have a prop-
erty right in the labor of another when slavery was abol-
ished.... It would seem a step backward now to propose that
the wife, by her investment in the husband's education, should
acquire a literal property right in his future labor.3"
The personal and unique character of a voice has been protected by
the courts. The court in Wilson v. Wilson ("Wilson") protected and rec-
ognized the unique character of one's personal attributes." At issue in
Wilson was the distribution of the husband's medical practice, including
goodwill.39 The court acknowledged that
where goodwill is a marketable business asset distinct from the
personal reputation of a particular individual, ... that goodwill
has an immediately discernible value as an asset of the busi-
ness.... On the other hand, if goodwill depends on the contin-
ued presence of a particular individual, such goodwill, by
definition, is not a marketable asset distinct from the individual
[It therefore] is not a proper consideration in dividing marital
property in a dissolution proceeding.'
The Wilson court concluded that for goodwill to be marital property, it
had to be of the sort that could be "sold, transferred, conveyed or
pledged."4 It is unreasonable to attempt to divide an asset that is insep-
arable from its holder. As one court recently noted, "The time has long
since passed when a person's personal attributes and talents were thought
to be subject to monetary valuation for commercial purposes. "42
Other cases have held that goodwill, even celebrity goodwill, can be
considered a marital asset subject to distribution. In the Piscopo v. Pis-
copo ("Piscopo") decision, upon which the Elkus court relied, the court
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
37. Henna Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL L. REv.
291, 313 (1987).
38. 741 S.W.2d 640 (Ark. 1987).
39. Goodwill is defined as "[t]he ability of a business to generate income in excess of nor-
mal rate on assets, due to superior managerial skills, market position, new product technology,
etc." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1990).
40. Wilson, 741 S.W.2d at 647 (quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 386 N.W.2d 851, 858 (Neb.
1986)) (emphasis added).
41. Wilson, 741 S.W.2d at 647.
42. Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1991).
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ruled that Joe Piscopo's4 3 celebrity goodwill was marital property, since
he rose to fame during the marriage.' The court held that the valuation
and distribution of Piscopo's celebrity goodwill prevented his spouse
from being deprived of what was perhaps the most significant marital
asset of one involved in the lucrative entertainment industry.4" Under
New Jersey law, goodwill may be found in one's capacity "to earn net
income in excess of the average practitioner of similar age, experience,
education and expertise, who expends a similar number of work hours at
the task in question."" This rigid definition, however, fails to take into
account the dynamic of the entertainment industry, where often there is
no "average practitioner" with which to compare highly successful
performers.
The Elkus court also relied on Golub v. Golub ("Golub") 47 as a basis
for classifying Mrs. Elkus' talent as a marital asset.4" In Golub, Marisa
Berenson married a successful, high-profile New York attorney.49 At the
end of their short, childless marriage, Mr. Golub claimed a stake in his
wife's appreciated acting and modeling career.5 0 His claim was based on
his contribution of legal advice and business savvy, which had helped her
to organize her financial affairs, resulting in appreciated assets.51 The
Golub court followed O'Brien blindly, applying it to a set of facts that
was distinguishable from those in O'Brien, reasoning that the O'Brien
holding had to be applied "even-handedly to all spouses."52 The Golub
court applied precedent much too broadly, ignoring the lack of unique
necessities that had prompted the O'Brien court to propose its novel
remedy.
The Golub court rejected Mrs. Golub's claim that celebrity goodwill
should be immune from marital property classification. 3 The court cited
other authorities that have protected fame where it was wrongfully
divested from its holder, such as when non-licensed entities use a celeb-
rity's likeness without permission. 4 If the precedent established by these
cases means anything, it must mean that the law favors protecting one
43. Joe Piscopo is a former actor on the NBC television program Saturday Night Live
44. 555 A.2d 1190 (N.J. Super. 1988).
45. Piscopo, 555 A.2d at 1193.
46. Id. at 1191 (citing Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 9 (N.J. 1983)).
47. Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (1991).
48. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
49. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
50. Id. at 949.
51. Id. at 948.
52. Id. at 950.
53. Id. at 949.
54. Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949 (1988) (citing Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
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whose efforts result in celebrity status or fame. To now hold that it is
acceptable to divest celebrity from its holder is to turn this precedent on
its head. The outcome of this case contained an additional twist: after
adopting its wholly new approach toward "celebrity" as a marital asset
in New York, the Golub court never actually distributed it for lack of
evidence as to its value.55
A Pennsylvania case, Beasley v. Beasley ("Beasley"), 56 demonstrates
a more reasonable interpretation of personal goodwill. The court in
Beasley found no separate goodwill where the earnings of a sole-practi-
tioner lawyer depended on his individual skill and experience. The court
concluded that the attorney's reputation should not be equated with
goodwill: the practice was not saleable, the individual skill and presence
of the attorney was key to continued business, and his enhanced earning
capacity should not serve as a basis for valuing or establishing a separate
goodwill component to the marital asset.57 The Beasley court recognized
that goodwill should be a separate marital property component to be di-
vided when it is transferrable.58 Since reputation and talent are not sale-
able, the court held, they should not be included in the realm of marital
property.
As in the case of non-saleable goodwill, entertainers should not have
their talent subject to marital distribution upon divorce. Entertainers are
unique; they are valuable because of their innate talents. This principle
was recognized by the court in Parker v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp.59 Actress Shirley MacLaine had signed a contract with Fox to do
a musical, which included a large guaranteed compensation.' When
that particular film was scrapped, Fox presented her with another film, in
a different genre, to fulfill her contract.6" MacLaine refused to act in the
subsequent film, and prevailed in a suit to recover her guaranteed com-
pensation from the musical.62 The court noted that performers cannot be
prevailed upon simply to do a generic job of acting: one film is not sub-
stantially similar to any other, so an actor need not mitigate damages by
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gary S. Stiffelman, Comment, Community Property
Interests in the Right of Publicity: Fame and/or Fortune, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1095 (1978).).
55. See Joel R. Brandes, Family Law, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 391, 425 (1989). The author
termed Golub "an absurd extension of the O'Brien doctrine." Id at 425.
56. 518 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1986).
57. Beasley, 518 A.2d at 552-53.
58. Id at 556 n.4.
59. 474 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1970).
60. Parker, 474 P.2d at 690.
61. Id. at 690-91.
62. Id. at 691.
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accepting other film offers.63 Actors' talents are not fimgible, as may be
the skills of wage-earners in most other occupations. Divorce courts
should recognize this distinction when dealing with entertainers, and re-
frain from categorizing their talents as ordinary marital property, to be
distributed along with the family car.
B. Improper Application of O'Brien Rationale
in Marriages of Long Duration
After analyzing the relevant Domestic Relations statute, the Elkus
court buttressed its reasoning by relying on principles stated in O'Brien. "
In O'Brien, the wife supported her husband through medical school, sac-
rificing a teaching certification and following him to Guadalajara, Mex-
ico, while he completed his schooling.65 Two months after his
graduation, he filed for divorce." Because the husband was just out of
school, and the wife's entire salary had been used to support them during
the marriage, there were no marital assets.67 Additionally, Mrs. O'Brien
was ineligible for separate maintenance,6" since at the time of the divorce,
she was still earning more than her husband. To rectify the inequity of
the situation, the court found that the medical license was the only asset
of the marriage, and that Mrs. O'Brien was entitled to a percentage of
her husband's increased earning capacity.69
The facts in Elkus are markedly different from those in O'Brien.
Although Mr. Elkus gave up professional singing, he devoted his energies
toward coaching his wife, in order to benefit both partners.70 They were
married for seventeen years, during which time they accumulated sub-
stantial marital assets.7" The inequities compelling the O'Brien result
63. The court stated that:
plaintiff's failure to accept defendant's tendered substitute employment could not be
applied in mitigation of damages because the offer of the "Big Country" lead was of
employment both different and inferior.... [T]he female lead as a dramatic actress
in a western style motion picture can by no stretch of imagination be considered the
equivalent of or substantially similar to the lead in a song-and-dance production.
Parker, 474 P.2d at 693-94.
64. See Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (1991).
65. O'Brien. 489 N.E.2d at 713-14.
66. Id. at 714.
67. It at 713.
68. Separate maintenance is defined as "[mloney paid by one married person to the other
for support if they are no longer living as husband and wife." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
1365 (6th ed. 1990).
69. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 720.
70. Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (1991).
71. Id. at 901-02 (Her salary of $621,878 in the last year of marriage, and the trial court's
holding that distribution of the parties' other assets would compensate Mr. Elkus, lead to the
conclusion that they had substantial marital assets.).
FAMILY LAW
simply were not present in the Elkus case-Mr. Elkus reaped the benefits
of their union through accumulation of assets, and was equipped to pro-
vide for himself by continuing as a voice coach. Their divided assets
would have amply compensated Mr. Elkus for his years of devotion to
the marriage, without invading the personal nature of Mrs. Elkus' voice.
1. Mechanical Application of the Statute
Courts should refrain from mechanically applying DRL section
236(B) without regard to the statute's intent. Section 236(B) was in-
tended to cure inequities that arise upon divorce when one spouse owns
all of the assets and the other will be left with nothing.7 2 The language of
the statute directs courts to consider "the circumstances of the case";
73
nothing in the statute indicates that the court must divide every conceiv-
able facet of the relationship. The Elkus family enjoyed years of substan-
tial income brought in by Mrs. Elkus. Thus, Mr. Elkus had no need to
double-dip by taking an equitable share of tangible assets and a share in
his wife's future singing career, when he would have been well taken care
of with a traditional divorce settlement. The court did not seem to take
note of this doubly compensatory result in its mechanical application of
the statute.
The Elkus court further mechanically applied the statute without
regard to its intent when it ignored the language of DRL section
236(B)(5)(e). This section provides that a court should grant distributive
awards when it would be "impractical or burdensome" to divide an inter-
est in a profession. 4 It is extremely burdensome to Mrs. Elkus to have
her voice parceled out to effectuate a property settlement. Because of
this burden to Mrs. Elkus, the court should have selected an equally ef-
fective but nonburdensome distributive award or method, such as perma-
nent alimony or a greater share of the traditional marital assets. The
court seemed blind to all language except the clause stating that "indirect
72. One commentator noted that the law was "advocated because experience had proven
to the New York Legislature that the traditional common-law title theory of property, as
applied under the Domestic Relations statute, had caused inequities upon the dissolution of a
marriage." David Kaufman, Comment, The New York Equitable Distribution Statute: An Up.
date, 53 BROOx. L. REv. 845, 846 (1987).
73. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(c) (McKinney 1990).
74. DRL section 236(B)(1)(b) defines a distributive award as "payments provided for in a
valid agreement between the parties or awarded by the court, in lieu of or to supplement,
facilitate or effectuate the division or distribution of property where authorized in a matrimo-
nial action, and payable either in a lump sum or over a period of time in fixed amounts." N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(l)(b) (McKinney 1990).
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contributions" are to be given weight in dividing marital property.7 5 In-
direct contributions are present in virtually every marriage in the form of
house cleaning, child-rearing, and emotional support for the other
spouse. If courts apply the Elkus holding literally, spouses will be
awarded a future stake in each other's careers simply because they were
spouses. This interpretation makes a mockery of divorce, which is sup-
posed to terminate a relationship, not permanently tie two people to-
gether who wish to be apart.
One additional problem with the Elkus court's interpretation of sec-
tion 236 is the non-remunerative intent of the statute. The Elkus court
recognized that marriage should be viewed as an economic partnership. 6
The court's interpretation of this concept, however, is incompatible with
the implications of "partnership." As one scholar noted, "This [partner-
ship] concept reflects the modem awareness that marriage is a union de-
pendent upon a wide range of non-remunerated services to the
partnership, such as homemaking, raising children and providing emo-
tional and moral support necessary to sustain the other spouse.",77 Yet, if
the Elkus court insists upon dividing assets so innately personal to the
holder, remuneration is exactly what the court effects. As one court re-
cently noted,
Although marriage is a partnership in some respects, a mar-
riage is certainly not comparable to a commercial partnership.
The efforts each spouse makes for the other and for their com-
mon marital interests cannot be quantified in monetary terms,
their respective contributions netted out, and a balance struck
at the termination of a marriage. The very idea of marriage
contemplates mutual effort and mutual sacrifice. 8
In Mahoney v. Mahoney,7 9 for example, the court noted that
"[m]arriage is not a business arrangement in which the parties keep track
of debits and credits, their accounts to be settled upon divorce."8 Simi-
larly, the court in DeWitt v. DeWitt ("DeWitt") 1 1 concluded that award-
ing a percentage interest in the other spouse's intangible assets "treats the
parties as though they were strictly business partners, one of whom has
made a calculated investment in the commodity of the other's profes-
75. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney 1990). See Elkus v. Elkus, 572
N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (1991).
76. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
77. Kaufman, supra note 72, at 846.
78. Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 540-41 (Utah 1991).
79. 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982).
80. Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 533.
81. 296 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
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sional training, expecting a dollar for dollar return. We do not think that
most marital planning is so coldly undertaken."8 2 In Lesman v. Les-
man, 13 the court reasoned that in a marriage, "[t]he parties agree upon
the manner in which they will provide financial support and non-finan-
cial services to each other, and they do not place values on their respec-
tive contributions, nor do they expect to pay each other for those
contributions. Every unsuccessful marriage results in the disappoint-
ment of expectations.... ."I' The reasoning of these courts contrasts with
the Elkus court's blind application of the statute. It was as if the court
kept a balance sheet: x number of hours spent babysitting, plus x
number of hours cooking dinner, entitles you to x percentage of your
wife's career. This approach is quite the-opposite of a non-remuneration
concept, which simply directs a court to divide property equitably. A
non-remunerative division can usually be accomplished without delving
into intangible assets.
In explaining its conclusion, the Elkus court reasoned that "the
O'Brien court did not restrict its holding to professions requiring a Hi-
cense or degree."85 While this may be true, the O'Brien court was con-
fronted with the following injustice: one spouse using the other as a
ticket to an education, then asking for divorce upon graduation before
the marriage has reaped the benefits of the educated spouse's earning
capacity. The court accordingly awarded the supporting spouse a share
in the educated spouse's degree. Any expansion of this solution should
occur only in circumstances similar to those the O'Brien court faced: (1)
unavailability of all traditional solutions; and (2) failure to devise a new
solution would impose a great inequity. The O'Brien court realized that
its solution was not necessary if the marriage had other assets to divide:
"When other marital assets are of sufficient value to provide for the sup-
porting spouse's equitable portion of the marital property, .. . the court
retains the discretion to distribute these other marital assets. . . in lieu of
an actual distribution of the value of the professional spouse's license."
'8 6
The Elkus court seems to have selectively read O'Brien when it ignored
this reasoning, since both maintenance and distribution of assets were
tools available to the court. The court's unorthodox solution was over-
reaching in that it gave Mr. Elkus more than he deserved.
82. DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d at 767.
83. 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982).
84. Lesman. 452 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
85. Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (1991).
86. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 718 (1991).
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2. "Reaping the Benefits" Theory Is More Appropriate
A more reasonable scheme of compensating spouses for contribu-
tions to education is codified at section 4800.3 of the California Civil
Code.17 This statute provides for reimbursement of the marital commu-
nity's contributions to a spouse's education or training that substantially
enhances that spouse's earning capacity."' Although "community con-
tributions" are limited to payments made, 9 the Elkus court could have
reached a just result by imputing a fair market value to Mr. Elkus'
coaching services.
The statute limits reimbursement to the community, however, if the
marriage lasts long enough to have reaped the benefits of the enhanced
earning capacity: "There is a rebuttable presumption, affecting the bur-
den of proof, . . . that the community has substantially benefited from
community contributions to the education or training made more than
10 years before the commencement of the proceeding."'9 This limitation
seems reasonable if the rationale for awarding or reimbursing a stake in a
spouse's increased earning capacity stems from the idea that the contrib-
uting spouse has not seen a return on his or her investment. If the parties
remain married for a period after earning more money, however, the con-
tributing spouse has then benefited from the investment and is entitled to
nothing more than a division of the tangible marital property. A court's
awarding of anything more amounts to overreaching.
This "reaping the benefits" theory has been recognized in equitable
distribution states. In Inman v. Inman,9 ' the court held that the wife
was entitled to a return on her investment in her husband's dental de-
gree.92 The court noted, however, that this approach was not appropri-
ate in all cases:
Proper guidelines for determining whether a marital property
classification is proper in a particular instance might include
whether there is more tangible marital property whose division
would work equity, and the extent to which there was recipro-
cal aid.... [An] important factor to consider might be the
extent to which the nonlicenseholder has already or otherwise
benefited financially from his or her spouse's earning capacity,
87. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4800.3 (West 1984).
88. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.3(b)(1) (West 1984).
89. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.3(a) (West 1984).
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3(c)(1) (West 1984).
91. 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
92. Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 270.
FAMILY LAW
or is eligible for maintenance.93
This theory was also recognized in In re Marriage of Graham.94 In
that case, the majority of the court denied relief to a wife who had sup-
ported her husband while he attained his master's degree in business ad-
ministration.95 The dissent, which would have awarded the wife a share
in her husband's increased earning capacity, nevertheless recognized that
such an award was not appropriate if the working spouse has already
benefited from her investment: "If the parties had remained married
long enough after the husband had completed his post-graduate educa-
tion so that they could have accumulated substantial property, there
would have been no problem." 96 Similarly, the court in Lesman refused
Mrs. Lesman's claim upon her husband's medical degree, based upon her
lack of contribution and her benefit from the degree.9" Articulating the
rationale behind the "reaping the benefits" theory, the court concluded
that "where the parties live together for a number of years after the hus-
band enters his profession, the wife's expectation is realized, in part at
least, and by participating in her husband's income, she receives a return
which may exceed the amount of her contributions to his education."98
In these cases, no need exists to fashion an extraordinary equitable rem-
edy. Standard alimony will achieve justice between the parties.
The trial court in Elkus properly adhered to the "reaping the bene-
fits" theory, because sufficient assets existed to compensate Mr. Elkus for
his contributions to the marriage. This court found that "since the de-
fendant enjoyed a substantial life style during the marriage and since he
would be sufficiently compensated through distribution of the parties'
other assets, the plaintiff's career was not marital property." '99 Thus, it
was unnecessary for Mr. Elkus to take a piece of his wife's personalty-
her voice-in addition to half of the traditional marital property. The
outcome subsequently reached by the appellate division imposed an ineq-
uitable result upon the innately talented Mrs. Elkus, who left the mar-
riage with half of the tangible property, and less than all of her voice,
which she now owes to her former husband.
93. Id at 269.
94. 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978).
95. Graham, 574 P.2d at 78.
96. Id (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
97. Lesman v. Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 939 (1982).
98. Id
99. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (appellate division characterizing the lower court's
judgment).
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C. Equity Is Not Served by Placing a Dollar Amount on Talent
The Elkus court purported to speak in the name of equity when it
awarded a share of Mrs. Elkus' voice to Mr. Elkus in return for his con-
tributions to the marriage. The court did not address the means of valua-
tion of the voice; this issue was left for the trial court on remand.
Because valuation is crucial to the concept of equity, the court shirked an
important aspect of the case.
1. The Elkus Court Relied on Inequitable Methods of Valuation
Two cases the Elkus court relied on to conclude that Mrs. Elkus'
voice was worth something at divorce were O'Brien and Piscopo. The
court in O'Brien attempted to place a value on the entire career of a
surgeon in order to do justice to a wife who had waited for her husband
to become a surgeon, only to receive a divorce decree. Awarding a forty
percent share of her husband's entire practice to the wife, the court re-
duced this amount to present value."c° The total amount was arrived at
by comparing the average income of a college graduate to that of a sur-
geon, and multiplying it by the number of years the surgeon would prob-
ably practice.10' How does the O'Brien court's valuation method apply
to an opera singer's voice? The simple answer is that it does not.
In Piscopo, the court awarded Joe Piscopo's wife a share in his celeb-
rity goodwill, because his wife had contributed by raising their children
and critiquing his ideas.'0 2 To appraise his celebrity, the court used a
standard borrowed from Dugan v. Dugan,3 a goodwill case. In deter-
mining if goodwill under this test exists, a court should look to "the prac-
titioner's demonstrated capacity, over a number of years preceding the
complaint fling, to earn net income in excess of the average practitioner
of similar age, experience, education and expertise, who expends a simi-
lar number of work hours at the task in question.""t 4 Although this
analysis is more suited to evaluating an opera singer's voice than the
O'Brien formulation, it is still problematic. Is Mrs. Elkus to be com-
pared to an average of all opera singers, to one average opera singer, or to
the average superstar opera singer? In Joe Piscopo's case, there were
other former Saturday Night Live actors to compare him to and the an-
swer was a little clearer.
100. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 714 (1985). The court does not explain why it
chose the 40% figure.
101. Id
102. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190, 1191 (1988).
103. 457 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1983).
104. Piscopo, 555 A.2d at 1191 (citing Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 9 (N.J. 1983)).
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Yet, valuation in this milieu is inherently problematic. One scholar
notes:
On the one hand, it might be unfair to the other spouse [to
award a share of the degree as property] because it may limit
compensation to whatever use the enhanced spouse makes of
the capacity. This may give the enhanced spouse too much
control over the compensation actually paid to the other
spouse. On the other hand, it may be unfair to the enhanced
spouse because it may force him to stay in a job which he no
longer wants, or force him to struggle to earn money that his
skill does not allow him to make. Furthermore, the calculation
is based on future earnings for the rest of the professional life of
the enhanced spouse, reduced to present day value. This may
be overly generous to the other spouse and is a lien on the
rights and interests of subsequent other spouses.1"5
2. Maintenance Awards Are More Equitable
Inequities that need to be addressed may exist in a divorce where
one spouse has made contributions to the other's career that have not
been remunerated. The answer, however, is not to place a monetary
value on something so intangible as a degree or a talent. The court in
DeWitt 106 agreed that the supporting spouse needed to be compensated
for putting her husband through law school, but concluded that "We
cannot agree, however, that equity is served by attempting to place a
dollar value on something so intangible as a professional education, de-
gree, or license.""0 7 This holding would necessarily apply with even
greater force to a talent that is innate to its holder.
Additionally, the DeWitt court rejected the reimbursement ap-
proach, explaining:
It fails to consider the scholastic efforts and acumen of the de-
gree holder, which may well have a bearing on the income-
yielding potential of the education. It treats the parties as
though they were strictly business partners, one of whom has
made a calculated investment in the commodity of the other's
professional training, expecting a dollar for dollar return. 08
The DeWitt court concluded that the most equitable solution is a mainte-
105. Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "'Enhanced Spouse/Other
Spouse" Divorces. 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 751, 780-81 (Oct. 1988) (citation omitted).
106. 296 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
107. DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d at 767.
108. Id.
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nance award, which does not surcharge the enhanced spouse by placing a
lien on future earnings. " After all, contributions by the working spouse
are factors to be considered in awarding maintenance, regardless of
need. 1 °" The maintenance solution avoids awkward classifications of
property and enhanced earning capacity as marital assets. 11 '
Some courts have rejected maintenance awards on the ground that
they terminate upon remarriage, so that the contributing spouse fails to
receive full reimbursement." 2 This argument lacks merit, however, be-
cause permanent alimony is an available option: judges can award ali-
mony or maintenance in a permanent or fixed duration, regardless of
future circumstances such as marriage.'1 3 Additionally, section 236 dic-
tates that maintenance awards are to be based on the parties' standard of
living during the marriage, in such amounts as justice requires." 4 Thus,
contrary to what the O'Brien court reasoned, courts have considerable
leeway in fashioning support for the non-enhanced spouse and are not
limited by what is "expressly" provided. 1 '
This solution of maintenance awards also avoids the spurious specu-
lation that some courts engage in when valuing an intangible asset such
as talent and future earning capacity. The O'Brien court dismissed the
argument that future earning capacity is too speculative by analogizing
to tort damages." 6 This summary dismissal was unwarranted because
tort damages for wrongful death are distinguishable in an important way:
no future variables can affect the award. The court in Martinez v. Marti-
nez 117 noted this distinction, explaining that "in wrongful death, the
measurement begins at death and is subject to no future variables intro-
duced by the decedent. Here, we must guess at the future course of de-
fendant's career.""' Because of this difficulty in predicting future
109. Id. at 768.
110. Id. at 769.
111. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
112. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 717 (1985).
113. Kaufman, supra note 72, at 850. "Judges can no longer avoid awarding substantial
long-term or permanent maintenance awards to women whose standard of living will signifi-
cantly decrease following a divorce." Id.
114. DRL section 236 provides that maintenance shall be awarded "in such amount as
justice requires, having regard for the standard of living of the parties established during the
marriage .... N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6)(a) (McKinney 1985).
115. See O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 717 ("The statute does not expressly authorize retrospec-
tive maintenance or rehabilitative awards and we have no occasion to decide in this case
whether the authority to do so may ever be implied from its provisions.").
116. Id at 718.
117. 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991).
118. Martinez 754 P.2d at 75 n.7.
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events, the court declined to find the medical degree marital property.' 19
In O'Brien, the court estimated how much the enhanced spouse
would earn before he had even earned anything. 20 Then, taking into
account all contributions, the court chose an arbitrary percentage to rep-
resent what the other spouse had contributed to his earning capacity.'
2 1
The court used these two unsubstantiated figures to determine the
amount of the distributive award, "thus building uncertainty upon uncer-
tainty in setting the award."' 22 This kind of speculation is generally dis-
couraged in the law, and should not be encouraged in questionable
classifications of property.
The court in In re Marriage of Goldstein confronted the issue of
speculative future earnings. 23 A wife who had supported her husband
through medical school claimed that his increased earning potential
should be categorized as marital property. 24 The court declined to do
so, based on the speculative nature of future employment. 25 The court
drew meaningful distinctions between what kinds of future income are
properly classified as marital property, and which are speculative and
therefore separate.126 The kinds of future income that a non-enhanced
spouse has a claim to are items such as military retirement pay, disability
benefits presently being paid, vested interests in pensions, and pension
benefits. 27 The reason that these income sources are characterized as
marital property to which both spouses may lay claim is that there is no
contingency in receiving them-they have already been earned. 12 These
types of income differ from future employment, in which the enhanced
spouse may become injured, may not earn as much as expected, or may
choose a different job.'29 These contingencies should not be included in
marital assets that are subject to distribution. As one court stated, "En-
119. Id at 78.
120. Batts, supra note 105, at 777. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 714 (1985)
("Plaintiff was licensed to practice medicine in October 1980. He commenced this action for
divorce two months later.").
121. Batts, supra note 105, at 777. See O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 714 (Forty percent was the
figure the court chose.).
122. Batts, supra note 105, at 777.
123. 423 N.F2d 1201 (Ill. App. 1981).
124. Goldstein, 423 N.E.2d at 1204.
125. Id
126. Id
127. Id
128. Id.
129. These contingencies were recognized in O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 720
(1985) (Meyer, J., concurring). Judge Meyer's solution, however, was not to immunize the
license from distribution, but to make the award subject to modification if there are changed
circumstances, much like alimony. Id
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hanced earning capacity is not property. It is not vested; it is only an
uncertain expectancy, for it is dependent upon the future success and
efforts of the degree holder."
130
D. Talent Requires Treatment Different from a Degree
Even if one successfully argues that a degree should be classified as
marital property, as it is a family investment, extension of this logic to
include a talent is untenable. In Woodworth v. Woodworth,' 3 the court
concluded that the husband's law degree was divisible marital property,
because it was the product of "concerted family investment."'' 32 In valu-
ing the degree for purposes of property settlement, the court estimated
what the degree holder would make in his profession, and subtracted
from that what he might have earned without the degree.' 33 This
method is problematic for degree valuation because someone with the
drive to complete a professional education would likely be doing well in
another occupation. 34 Additionally, this method is impossible to apply
to a talent. A judge cannot "subtract" what Mrs. Elkus would have
earned without her voice.
1. Talent Is Personal
Some courts have declined to award one spouse a portion of the
other spouse's degree because of its personal nature. In Martinez v. Mar-
tinez, " for example, the court stated that "distribution ignores the fact
that the degree is personal to [the] defendant."' 36 Similarly, the court in
In re Marriage of Graham '"I declared that "[a]n advanced degree is a
cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined with
diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the mere expendi-
ture of money. It is simply an intellectual achievement that may poten-
tially assist in the future acquisition of property."',3
As personal as a degree is, a voice is even more so. People do not
start out with degrees in their pockets and build upon them-they are
130. Lesman v. Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938 (1982).
131. 337 N.W.2d 332 (Mich. App. 1983).
132. Woodworth, 337 N.W.2d at 334.
133. Id. at 337.
134. In Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982), the court stated that "a person
with the ability and motivation to complete professional training or higher education would
probably utilize those attributes in concommitantly productive alternative endeavors." IM at
532 (quoting the appellate division's opinion, 182 NJ. Super. 598, 609).
135. 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991).
136. Martinez 754 P.2d at 75.
137. 574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978).
138. Graham, 574 P.2d at 77.
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wholly acquired and earned. In contrast, one does not "earn" or "ac-
quire" a voice. One can improve upon the voice that one already has, but
one cannot acquire a talent by any amount of effort. Few people are
capable of singing with the New York Metropolitan Opera, regardless of
how many voice lessons they pay for. A part of the classic movie Citizen
Kane 1 39 illustrates this point well. Although Kane's second wife re-
ceived the best voice lessons money could buy, no one wanted to hear her
because she did not have the qualities necessary to sing opera. A talent is
even more personal to the holder than a degree, and cannot be acquired
even through hard work. Thus, it is illogical to extend the marital prop-
erty definition to include either talent or degrees.
The law has historically granted protection to such personal attrib-
utes as voices, but declined to uniformly protect educational degrees. A
recent example of this occurred in Midler v. Ford Motor Co., in which
Bette Midler sued Ford for hiring an impersonator of her voice to use in
their commercials without her permission." 4 The Ninth Circuit held in
favor of Ms. Midler upon the theory that Ford had misappropriated her
voice."14 The driving motivation behind the court's decision was the
uniquely personal nature of one's voice. As the court reasoned:
A voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not "fixed."
What is put forward as protectible here is more personal than
any work of authorship.... A voice is more distinctive and
more personal than the automobile accouterments [sic] pro-
tected in Motschenbacher. "2 A voice is as distinctive and per-
sonal as a face. The human voice is one of the most palpable
ways identity is manifested.... A fortiori, these observations
hold true of singing, especially singing by a singer of renown.
The singer manifests herself in the song. To impersonate her
voice is to pirate her identity.... California will recognize an
injury from an appropriation of the attributes of one's
identity. 143
The Ninth Circuit recognized the highly personal nature of one's
voice, especially to one who makes a living by it.1" The Elkus court's
attempt to divest Mrs. Elkus of sole rights in her voice was tantamount
139. CITIZEN KANE (RKO 1941).
140. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
141. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
142. In Motschenbacher v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974), the
court protected unauthorized use of a famous race car driver's car in commercials to sell
cigarettes.
143. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462-63 (citation omitted).
144. J.d
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to misappropriating her identity-an action for which some courts will
provide a remedy. Although various jurisdictions differ in their laws
upon many subjects, every state should afford some degree of protection
to something as important as one's identity.
2. Talent Cannot Be Appropriated or Licensed
Variation on this theory of personal rights was expressed by Dean
William Prosser, a recognized authority on tort law. Prosser character-
ized the right to be protected from appropriation as a personal right,
which is not assignable.14 This interest in non-appropriation of one's
privacy or publicity is an exclusive proprietary right. Although some
forms of publicity are assignable, they should not be mistaken for prop-
erty. One court "refused to affix the 'property' label to [the right of pub-
licity] on the ground that it was 'immaterial' . . . since 'the tag
"property" simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which
has pecuniary worth.' "146 This interpretation undercuts the O'Brien line
of cases, which hold that various personal attributes and accomplish-
ments are property simply because the law affords a remedy for their
invasion.
As one court recognized, "a personal right is limited to the lifetime
of the celebrity. Thus, once the person protected by the right expires, so
does the personal right. Conversely, a property right would theoretically
descend for as long as a single heir exists to inherit the assets of the
estate."' 4 7 This statement demonstrates the distinction between a per-
sonal right, such as the right to vote, which is not property, and a prop-
erty right, which can descend to heirs. A human voice defies
classification as property because of its inherently personal nature.
Where the law has been used to shield voices from unwarranted misap-
propriation, this law should not be turned on its head for use as a sword
to divest one of one's very identity. Seemingly, the New York divorce
courts would like to apportion everything that they can see and hear.
No reason exists not to afford protection to a distinctly personal at-
tribute in divorce, when attributes less personal than a voice have been
145. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs § 117, 814-15 (4th ed.
1971).
146. Jeanne Ann McManus, Right of Publicit--Famous Persons Right of Publicity Is De-
scendible-The Need for a Durational Limit on the Right of Publicity-Groucho Marx Produc-
tions, Inc v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 190, 198
(1983) (quoting Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953)).
147. McManus, supra note 146, at 206 (quoting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425,
430-31 (1979)).
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protected from appropriation. In Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toi-
lets, 4 for example, the court protected a phrase associated with come-
dian and talk show host Johnny Carson from being appropriated:
"Here's Johnny." '49 Carson found it objectionable that a business was
using a phrase associated with him to sell their toilets, 150 and the court
agreed, enjoining such usage.151 Similarly, the court in Motschenbacher
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 52 protected a famous race car driver's car
against unauthorized use in a televised cigarette commercial-the car
was an identifying characteristic."5 3 In Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc., 54 the court protected Guy Lombardo's distinctive con-
ducting gestures. A commercial for automobiles had aired with a
"Lombardo likeness" conducting a big band playing Auld Lang Syne,
with concommitant New Year's decorations, while new cars rotated
around them. 5 The court found that the commercial contained identi-
fying characteristics peculiar to Lombardo-his conducting style-and
enjoined further airing of the commercial. 56 These cases demonstrate
instances of the law's protection of much more generic characteristics
than one's voice. Surely, the law should not protect one's car before pro-
tecting one's voice.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the law's attempt to remedy the inequities faced by women in the
family law context, the New York courts have reached beyond reason in
Elkus v. Elkus. The decisions following O'Brien seem to take too much
liberty in construing the legislative intent to afford liberal distribution of
marital property as a green light to make liberal classifications of prop-
erty. The courts' interpretations of the Domestic Relations statute are
not only flawed because they confuse classification with distribution, but
they have also rendered the future of divorcing couples unpredictable
and potentially inequitable in cases of talented or otherwise enhanced
spouses. The Elkus court's unorthodox solution was unwarranted; tradi-
tional remedies, such as permanent alimony or other forms of mainte-
nance, adequately achieve equity upon dissolution.
148. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
149. Carson, 698 F.2d at 836.
150. Id at 834.
151. Id at 836.
152. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
153. Motschenbacher 498 F.2d at 822.
154. 396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 1977).
155. Lombardo, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
156. Id at 664.
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The Elkus court's holding implies that couples will be permanently
bound to each other by owing their livelihood to the other, unless all
education and training are complete before marriage. Keeping track of
contributions goes against the fiber of marriage, in which each spouse is
dedicated to furthering the good of the partnership. To keep a record of
daily chores undermines the essence and meaning of a marriage. The
expectation of compensation for every task performed transforms mar-
riage into an arm's length business transaction.
Even if the award to a contributing spouse of a share in a license can
be justified, awarding a contributing spouse a share in a voice can never
be. A voice is an attribute that is too personal to be divested from its
holder, regardless of the magnitude of the other spouse's contributions.
The Elkus court had no necessity to expand O'Brien because there were
abundant assets to satisfy both parties. Further, any contribution Mr.
Elkus had made was well-compensated during the duration of the mar-
riage, as evidenced by the substantial income that the family enjoyed. To
also award him a share in his wife's identity was an insult to her, and
over-compensated Mr. Elkus for his contributions.
A voice cannot be earned or passed to descendants. It is distinguish-
able, therefore, from a property right. Additionally, courts should afford
protection to assets that are personal to their holder, when race cars, arm
movements, and phrases introducing celebrities have been protected
from unauthorized divestment. The provision of lesser protection to a
more important personal attribute is an anomaly that should not be sanc-
tioned. The spouses of New York cannot be expected to abide by such
an inconsistency in the law: equity demands that one's identity be pro-
tected in court, and that divorce laws be interpreted accordingly.
Janine R. Menhennet*
* The author would like to dedicate this comment to her husband Mark, for his love and
support; to her sister Charlene, for her love and admiration; and to her parents, for their love
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